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Abstract
We investigate the business model configurations associated with high and low firm performance by
conducting a qualitative comparative analysis of firms competing in Formula One racing. We find that
configurations of two business models—one focused on selling technology to competitors, the other
one on developing and trading human resources with competitors—are associated with high perform-
ance. We also investigate why these configurations are high-performing and find that they are under-
pinned by capability-enhancing complementarities, accelerating firms’ learning and supporting the
development of focused firms’ capabilities.
JEL classification: M10 – Business Administration (General)
1. Introduction
Technological innovation is critical for firm performance, yet the common assumption that technological innovation
is directly connected to superior firm performance overlooks the key role of business models (Amit and Zott, 2001;
Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013). Business models are cognitive devices representing a business enterprise’s value
creation and value capture activities (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010; Teece,
2010). By adopting different business models managers can, for example, leverage the same technology to target dif-
ferent customer segments, as in the case of satellite technologies used for selling both communication services and
navigation devices. Thus, business models connect the technological and economic domains of a business by articu-
lating “a value proposition latent in the new technology” (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 534). Although the
role of business models is increasingly recognized (see Klang et al., 2014 for a review), we echo some recent works
(e.g., Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013) in claiming that our understanding of the relationship between business
models and firm performance in technology-based environments (i.e., contexts where firms are pressured to
constantly innovate their technology to compete) is still incomplete.
In particular, previous studies of business models have devoted relatively little attention to the fact that firms often
run multiple business models simultaneously, thus implementing configurations of business models (for exceptions
see Markides and Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012). Business model
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configurations are especially important in technology-based environments where firms often “require distinct busi-
ness models that operate in tandem” (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012: 132) to develop multiple revenue
streams with the same technology. For example, Amazon uses the same online platform to sell both cloud computing
services and household goods, targeting different customer segments with different business models. Analyzing
Amazon’s multiple business models as a configuration (rather than as a set of isolated elements) would reveal the po-
tential synergies among the firm’s business models, such as cross-selling opportunities between the different targeted
customer groups. More generally, a configurational approach is valuable because it indicates when a firm’s business
models are complementary—i.e., when the joint adoption of two or more business models is associated with higher
firm performance than the separate adoption of each business model (c.f. MacDuffie, 1995; Kogut et al., 2004).
Despite its analytical value, extant literature has overlooked the configuration of a firm’s business models as a salient
unit of analysis to better understand firm performance, mostly focusing on the performance implications of single
business models considered in isolation (see Klang et al., 2014 for review). In addition, the exact nature of the com-
plementarities underpinning high-performing configurations has not been fully unpacked in previous studies (e.g.,
Grandori & Furnari, 2008), so that we do not have a systematic understanding of why high-performing business
model configurations are associated with high performance. Accordingly, in this article we investigate the following
two research questions:Which configurations of business models are associated with high and low levels of firm per-
formance in a technology-based environment? What is the nature of the complementarities underlying high-perform-
ing configurations?
We address these questions with a qualitative comparative analysis of the business model configurations adopted
by the 28 Formula One (F1) racing firms competing between 2005 and 2013. The F1 industry constitutes a technol-
ogy-based environment characterized by the continuous development of cutting-edge motorsport technology (e.g.,
Jenkins et al., 2005; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Jenkins, 2010, 2014). Major automobile companies participate in
F1 competitions in order to develop and test successful technological solutions, which are often later adopted in
standard road cars. Thus, by studying F1, we also elucidate an important source of innovation for the global automo-
tive industry that is connected to tomorrow’s mobility.
Given the relative scarcity of systematic scholarly understanding of business model configurations, our study is ex-
ploratory in nature. Our broader goal is to sensitize future research on a relatively under-studied topic. We identify and
describe business model configurations, analyze their associations with firm performance, and explore the nature of these
associations. In other words, our main focus is not on identifying precise causal patterns but rather on qualitatively investi-
gating the mechanisms underlying the associations between business model configurations and firm performance.
Our empirical inquiry followed three steps. First, by coding archival data and interviews with F1 experts, we iden-
tified the business model configurations adopted by F1 firms. Second, we analyzed these configurations and their as-
sociation with firm performance via Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), a configurational, case-oriented,
method (Ragin, 1987, 2008) well-suited to address our research questions. Third, we inductively explored why the
business models bundled in the high-performing configurations (identified via QCA) are complementary—i.e., why
some of the configurations are actually high-performing. For this purpose, we conducted a second round of inter-
views with F1 experts to interpret our QCA results, inquiring into the synergies underpinning high-performing
configurations.
Taken together, our analyses revealed two main findings. First, five of the six configurations associated with high
performance feature the joint adoption of two specific business models: (i) a F1 supply business model focused on
selling technological components (e.g., engines) to other F1 firms (i.e., direct competitors in F1 racing); (ii) a talent
business model focused on the development and trade of F1 drivers with other F1 firms. In addition, these two
business models are not featured in any (with the exception of one) of the 10 configurations associated with low
performance. Second, we discovered that these two business models not only allow accessing valuable resources
(i.e., financial, knowledge, human), but are linked by capability-enhancing complementarities, so that the joint
implementation of the two business models supports the development of firms’ capabilities, fostering faster learning
and strengthening the firms’ focus on their core activities.
2. Theoretical background
Through the literature on business models, scholars have aimed to understand the complex systems of activities by
which firms generate and capture value. Despite the growing body of research on this topic, several problems remain
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unsolved—most prominently the relationship between business models and firm performance (e.g., Zott and Amit,
2007, 2008). This issue is complex because, especially in technology-based environments, firms run multiple business
models simultaneously to leverage the multiple commercial uses of the same technology (e.g., Markides and
Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). Evaluating how business model choices affect firms’ performance can be chal-
lenging when business models cannot be considered in isolation and should be understood within the configuration
of the other business models that the firm implements (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010). Yet, be-
yond the notion that new technology can trigger change in business models (Bjo¨rkdahl, 2009; Chesbrough, 2010),
extant literature provides relatively scarce empirical evidence of how the heterogeneity of business models relates to
firm performance. To tackle this thorny issue, we first introduce the definition of business model informing our re-
search and then discuss the concept of business model configuration.
2.1 Defining business models
Teece (2010: 172) argues that a business model defines “the manner in which the enterprise delivers value to cus-
tomers, entices customers to pay for value, and converts those payments into profits.” Business models can describe
any type of business enterprise: a service firm, a local cafe, a racing company, a sports federation, or a television sta-
tion. In this study, we follow the research tradition conceptualizing the business model as a cognitive device to ac-
count and articulate a business’ value creation and capture activities (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Baden-
Fuller and Morgan, 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Teece, 2010; Martins et al., 2015).
More specifically, we follow the conceptualization of Baden-Fuller and Mangematin (2013) in specifying four
constitutive elements of a business model: customer sensing, customer engagement, monetization, and value chain
linkages. Customer sensing refers to the identification of customer groups and their demands. Customer engagement
consists in defining the value proposition. A common distinction in the literature separates predesigned (i.e., “bus”)
products and services from custom-made (i.e., “taxi”) solutions. Monetization addresses how firms capture portions
of the value that they create, encompassing pricing and the mechanisms (e.g., freemium, work for hire, etc.) by which
customers can be convinced to pay for the products or services that they consume. Finally, value chain linkages con-
cern the governance architecture of value creation and capture, defining the degrees of integration in a firm’s relation-
ships with its suppliers and other stakeholders (vertical integration vs. network architecture).
2.2 Business model configurations and performance in technology-based environments
Technology-based environments are arenas in which firms are frequently pressured to innovate their technology to
compete. In these contexts, technological innovation often allows firms to implement “several different business
models simultaneously to serve different consumers [ . . . and to] help them to develop the market value of their activ-
ities and generate revenue streams to balance the uncertainties” (Sabatier et al., 2010: 432). Consider, for example,
the case of Netflix, which uses two business models simultaneously—one for its DVD-by-mail services and another
for its streaming-video services. In such cases, the unit of analysis that is most useful to understand how business
models relate to performance is the configuration of business models that a firm implements—rather than any single
business model per se. In fact, adopting a configurational perspective on business models allows us to evaluate
whether a firm’s different business models are complements (Markides and Charitou, 2004; Sabatier et al., 2010;
Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012). Recent studies suggest that to foster performance without cannibalizing its
different activities, a firm implementing two business models simultaneously needs “to balance the benefits of keep-
ing the two business models separate while at the same time integrating them enough so as to allow them to exploit
synergies with one another” (Markides and Charitou, 2004: 22). The need for such a balance implies the existence of
an optimum point in the trade-off across different business models, which can be achieved by varying the way in
which they fit with each other (e.g., see also Sabatier et al. 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012). However,
there are also cases in which different business models in a configuration conflict with each other. Consider, for ex-
ample, the case of Kodak, which ran two business models—one for digital and one for film photography—for a
long time without acknowledging that the models were not complements (see Gavetti et al., 2005). These cases of
success and failure represent two sides of the same coin: to leverage the potential value that is embedded in their
technology, firms need to appreciate the variety of business models that they implement and understand the possible
complementarities among them. For this reason, different business model configurations can be expected to be asso-
ciated with different levels of performance, providing insights into the complementarities underlying high
performance.
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3. Data and methods
Our study is based on a qualitative comparative analysis of the business model configurations adopted by all the F1
firms competing during the period between 2005 and 2013 (a total of 28 firms—see Table 1 for details on the F1
firms). In the following sections, we first describe our research setting, illustrating in particular why we decided to
focus on the F1 industry and why this setting provides insights for other industries. Second, we describe the data that
we collected and our research design. Third, we present the methods that we used to identify the business models
within the F1 industry and to analyze the relationships between business model configurations and performance as
well as their underlying complementarities.
3.1 Research setting
F1 is not only the most technologically advanced motorsport in the world but also an empirical setting increasingly
used for robust management research (e.g., Jenkins, 2010, 2014; Pinch et al., 2003; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010;
Marino et al., 2015). F1 racing comprises an annual calendar of about 12 car races. In each race, each F1 firm (also
called “F1 team” due to the sport nature of this industry) competes by having two drivers racing two almost identical
cars. Drivers gain a number of points according to their arrival position in each race, and the final tally at the end of
the season reflects the total points that they gain over the series of races. Since 1981, all F1 firms are required to de-
velop their own car chassis internally, although the engine and all the other components can be purchased from third
parties (external suppliers or other F1 firms).
F1 is an industry that is worthy of research attention per se as it has an estimated yearly turnover of more than
US$ 3.5 billion, employs approximately 50,000 people in more than 30 countries, and represents the pinnacle of
automotive technologies (Jenkins et al., 2005). F1 innovations have made their way not only into the regular
Table 1. F1 firms participating in Formula 1 races between 2005 and 2013
Nr. F1 firm Debut Years as F1 firm
1 Arrows 1978 1978–2002
2 BAR 1999 2000–2005
3 Benetton 1986 1986–2001
4 BMW 1952 1952–1952, 2006–2010
5 Brawn 2009 2009–2009
6 Caterham 2012 2012–2013
7 Ferrari 1950 1950–2013
8 Force India 2008 2008–2013
9 Honda 1964 1964–1968, 2006–2008
10 HRT 2010 2011–2012
11 Jaguar 2000 2000–2004
12 Jordan 1991 1991–2005
13 Lotus 2012 2012–2013
14 Marussia 2012 2012–2013
15 McLaren 1966 1966–2013
16 Mercedes 1954 1954–1955, 2010–2013
17 Midland 2006 2006–2006
18 Minardi 1985 1985–2005
19 Prost 1997 1997–2001
20 Red Bull Racing 2005 2005–2013
21 Renault 1977 2002–2011
22 Sauber 1993 1993–2013
23 Spiker 2007 2007–2007
24 Super Aguri 2006 2006–2008
25 Scuderia Toro Rosso 2006 2006–2013
26 Toyota 2002 2002–2009
27 Virgin 2010 2010–2011
28 Williams 1977 1977–2013
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automotive industry (e.g., ABS brakes, traction control, hybrid powertrains, etc.) but also into the bicycle (e.g., car-
bon-fiber composite frames) and sailing (e.g., composites for racing boats rudders) industries (Moskvitch, 2011).
Further, F1 innovations have provided technologies that are now used in factories, hospitals, and Olympics’ sports
training (e.g., advanced telemetry systems, high-speed swimming suits) and that have contributed to advanced engin-
eering (e.g., virtual simulators) and even public transportation systems (e.g., flywheel energy storage mechanisms).
The F1 industry provides at least three advantages for this study. First, F1 offers a clear and reliable measure of
performance: as Gino and Pisano note, in motorsport, “performance is unambiguously measurable by lap times and
race results” (2011: 70). We align with other studies of this setting by using the final championship classification as a
viable measure of performance because winning races represents what all firms declare to be their ultimate goal
(Bothner et al., 2007; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Jenkins, 2010; Marino et al., 2015). In addition, evidence suggests
that F1 racing results are correlated with financial performance (Sylt and Reid, 2011; Black et al., 2013). Second, we
echo other scholars (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010; Marino et al., 2015) in claiming that the key similarities among F1
firms, such as their comparable sizes, organizational structures, and focus on producing one specific technological
product (i.e., the car), represent an important natural “control,” strengthening the internal validity of empirical ana-
lyses, especially in qualitative studies such as ours. Third, the media and fans’ great interest in F1 has facilitated the
accumulation of a large amount of publicly available archival data, which typically offer very detailed accounts of F1
firms and their technologies. We discuss the limitations of this setting in the concluding section of the article.
3.2 Data and sample
We collected secondary data from a broad range of sources—i.e., books, industry reports, specialized and generalist
press, etc. (see Table 2 for a list of all our data sources). These sources have been selected because they are established
and reliable sources of information about F1.
We used these data to construct a 9-year (2005–2013) longitudinal database containing information on the busi-
ness model configurations and performance of all the 28 F1 firms participating in F1 racing competitions during the
period between 2005 and 2013 (see Table 1). Following previous research on the topic (e.g., Gino and Pisano, 2011),
firm performance was measured as the F1 firm’s final rank in the Constructor Championship in each of the nine rac-
ing seasons from 2005 to 2013 (ranking data were taken from the two official, publicly available, F1 ranking data-
bases: “Forix on Autosport” and “Formula 1”).
The business models that each F1 firm adopted were coded, year by year, by following the qualitative data ana-
lysis and coding methodology described in the next section. The sample of analyzed F1 firms is unbalanced across the
years: while certain firms competed in all 9 years, others exited and new firms entered the racing competition. The
unbalanced nature of our longitudinal sample does not constrain our configurational analysis, but rather constitutes
an opportunity to identify robust configurations across time. Indeed, the fact that the population of F1 firms changes
over time allowed us to assess whether there are high- and low-performing business model configurations that remain
stable over time despite changes in the population of firms, thus offering an opportunity to identify more robust con-
figurations across the nine seasons we analyzed. We decided to use the year 2005 as a starting year in our data set be-
cause this is the first year in which some of the business models that we identified (e.g., external knowledge transfer
business model) were first adopted in the F1 industry.
3.3 Data analysis and methods
Our data analysis proceeded in three steps. First, by reading and coding our secondary data and the interviews with
our informants (see Table 3), we identified all the business models that were implemented in the F1 industry between
2005 and 2013, coding whether each F1 firm adopted the identified business models in each year. Second, we used
QCA (Ragin, 1987) to investigate the association between the business model configurations that F1 firms adopted
in a specific year (time0) and the firms’ performance in the following year (time1). To further substantiate the results
of the QCA with longitudinal qualitative evidence, we integrated this analysis with two case histories of two F1 firms
whose performance changed with the adoption of a new business model configuration. Third, to investigate the na-
ture of the complementarities underlying the high-performing business model configurations (identified via QCA),
we conducted a second round of interviews with our informants, and we qualitatively analyzed the content of those
interviews. Below, we describe the methodology that we followed in our coding and QCA.
To identify the business models adopted by F1 firms, we followed a two-pronged coding methodology. First, we
read and interpreted all the 166 documents constituting our database (see Table 2) by using the conceptualization of
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business model elements illustrated above (Baden-Fuller and Mangematin, 2013) as an “orienting framework for in-
terpretation” (Kelle, 2007). We then started coding the secondary data into the four categories defined by the frame-
work (i.e., customer identification, customer engagement, value chain linkages, monetization), identifying distinctive
business models depending on how they differ with respect to these dimensions. This first phase of coding led us to a
preliminary classification of business models, which initially included six business models. We then excluded two
business models shared by all the firms, focusing only on those four business models whose adoption varies across F1
firms.1 In a second step, we validated our initial coding by triangulating the evidence emerging from the secondary
Table 2. Data sources
Type of source Sources Number of documents
Books Who Works in Motorsports 2
Who Works in F1 9
The Art of War (Parr 2013) 1
Formula Money (Sylt and Reid, 2010; 2014) 2
Official Formula 1 Season Review (Cooper and Dodgings 2013) 1
The Official BBC Sport Guide: Formula One (Jones 2013) 1
Formula One Technical Analysis (Piola 2013) 9
Autocourse 2013/14: The World’s Leading Grand Prix Annual (Dodging et al. 2013) 1
Technical press Racecar Engineering 1
Autosport 8
Motor Sport magazine 5
F1 Racing 3
Race Tech International 4
General press Financial Times (F1 Special Report) 4
The Economist 6
The Guardian 8
Forbes 7
Gazzetta dello Sport (Italian) 9
Web sites and blogs BBC.co.uk 8
Autosport.com 5
Formula1.com 9
F1Fanatic.com 4
JamesAllenonF1.com 7
JoeSaward.wordpress.com 11
F1professor.wordpress.com 5
Othersa 10
F1 firms official sites 14
Videos BBC Sport 3
Sky Sports 1
Automotive TV 1
AutoMoto TV 1
Nuvolari Channel 2
Audio commentaries BBC F1 podcast 3
Technical reports FIA official reports 1
166
aAbout.com F1 (1); F1technical.com (2); PlanetF1.com (1); GPtoday.com (1); Thepaddockmagazine.com (1); Theguardian.com (2).
1 Detailed descriptions of all the F1 business models in place are available in the appendix. The exclusion of these busi-
ness models from the analysis is consistent with the fact that our use of QCA is focused on identifying sufficient, rather
than necessary, configurations for an outcome (Ragin, 2008).
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data with primary interviews with F1 experts (see Table 3). We discarded inconsistent codes and, as recommended
by Woodside (2010: 33–36), we stopped this process when the codes were sufficiently stable across different data
sources and informants. Once we had a stable classification of the business models used in the F1 industry, we coded
each F1 firm into the four identified business models for each year depending on whether the firm adopted a particu-
lar business model in that particular year. Through this coding process, we obtained the configuration of business
models that each F1 firm adopted in each year.
To identify which configurations of business models are associated with performance, we analyzed our longitu-
dinal database with QCA. QCA is a case-oriented methodology combining case-based research with Boolean algebra
and set theory, to allow systematic and formalized cross-case comparisons (Ragin, 1987, 2008). QCA is well suited
to address our research questions because it conceives cases as configurations of conditions, identifying whether
some of these configurations are more consistently associated with an outcome of interest. To do so, QCA treats
each case as a member of multiple sets and conceives both conditions and outcome as sets. In the crisp-set version of
Table 3. Interviews with expert informants
Job/role F1 expert profile Interview hours Interview hours
Round 1 Round 2
F1 academic expert Professor of management: 2 2
He has extensively published in top management journals using F1
databases. He is considered one of the premier academic experts
on management in F1.
F1 academic expert Full professor of mechanical engineering: 2 –
He has extensive knowledge on motorsport and F1 technology. He
serves as external consultant on engineering aspects for Formula
1 firms.
F1 media expert F1 journalist: 3 –
He formerly worked in the media and communication department
for some F1 firms. He now serves as editor and correspondent
on F1 for one of the most important business and finance media
companies. He is also a commentator for F1 races in one of the
main national channels.
F1 media expert F1 journalist: 4 –
He is one of the very few long-term reporters worldwide who spe-
cializes in covering the business of F1. He now serves as editor
for F1 in two major media firms.
F1 media expert F1 journalist: 2 2
Journalist, well-known blogger, and adjunct lecturer on F1, he
serves as external advisor in the board of directors of an F1 firm.
F1 professional F1 firm A CEO: 5 –
He worked for more than a decade as the managing director of
three F1 firms. In recent years, he won an F1 world champion-
ship title with the firm that he managed. He now works as busi-
ness consultant for a renowned firm in F1.
F1 professional F1 firm B top manager: 4 3
He is a current human resource director in an F1 firm and former
human resource manager in another F1 firm. He is involved in
the driver development program.
F1 professional F1 firm B manager: 2 –
As a current logistic manager and member of an F1 firm, he has an
extensive career in motorsport with former F1 firms.
F1 professional Former technical director F1 firm C: 3 –
As a retired technical director of several F1 firms, he works as
senior F1 technical analyst for a major media firm.
27 7
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QCA adopted here, each case is coded as either “in” or “out” a set, being assigned the value of 1 or 0, respectively.
For example, a given F1 firm can be coded “in” or “out” the set of “high-performance firms.” This process of “cali-
bration” of cases into sets requires the use of theory-based and case-specific knowledge to choose meaningful cutoff
values (Ragin, 2008). We used the results of our qualitative coding to calibrate our cases (i.e., F1 firms) into the sets
representing the business models that F1 firms adopt. Thus, for each year, we consider a given F1 firm as a member
of a given set (e.g., the set of firms adopting the talent business model) when we had coded that particular F1 firm as
adopting the given business model on that year. In addition, on the basis of the first author’s knowledge of the F1 in-
dustry’s history and on the basis of three validating interviews with our key informants (see Table 3, Round 2), we
coded each F1 firm as a member of the set “high-performing firms” when it was among the top five teams in the final
rank of the year’s racing season, for each year. We coded each F1 firm as a member of the set “low-performing firms”
when it was not among the top five firms in the final rank of the year’s racing season, for each year. Starting from the
calibrated data, QCA generates a “truth table” (Ragin, 1987), listing all the logically possible configurations of con-
ditions. Given the small-N nature of our sample, we chose to analyze all configurations that had at least one case, set-
ting the frequency threshold of the analysis to 1, as commonly accepted in small-N QCA studies (see Greckhamer
et al., 2013). Starting from this truth table, QCA identifies the configurations associated with the outcome of inter-
ests through minimization algorithms that eliminate logically redundant configurations (see Ragin, 1987). We con-
ducted a 1-year lagged QCA analysis of our longitudinal database to investigate whether particular business model
configurations that were adopted at time0 are associated with high or low performance at time1. The 1-year time lag
aims to account for the fact that the adoption of a business model configuration might take some time to become
fully operational. Given that this article is not concerned with business model changes as its main focus, the value of
using QCA on a longitudinal database is not to detect changes, but rather to identify what are the high-/low-perform-
ing configurations that are robust over time despite environmental changes and despite changes in the population of
F1 firms competing across the years.
4. Results
To respond to our first research question, we first report in Table 4 below the four key business models constituting
the elements of the configurations. Second, we report the QCA results in conjunction with the longitudinal case his-
tories enriching the QCA findings. Table 4 summarizes the four business models that we identified through our quali-
tative coding, illustrating their different constituent parts based on their definitions discussed above. More detailed
descriptions of the business models identified are available in the appendix.
4.1 Configurations of business models and performance
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the results of our QCA analyses, namely, the business model configurations associated with
high and low performance in each of the eight (1-year lagged) temporal windows. Following Ragin and Fiss (2008),
in the tables we denote the presence of a condition in a configuration with a black circle and the absence of a condi-
tion with a crossed circle.
Through QCA, we identified six distinctive configurations for high performance across the 9 years examined.
Some of these configurations occur more frequently across the years. In particular, configurations “c” and “d” occur
four times across the analyzed years, whereas configurations “e” and “f” occur twice each. By examining Table 6,
we also notice that some elements are common across all the configurations examined over the years. In particular,
as emphasized by the gray box in Table 5, we notice that all the configurations (with the exception of configuration
“a” in 2005–2006) feature the joint adoption of both the supply and the talent business models. In addition, we note
that these two business models are often combined with the adoption of the internal knowledge transfer business
model in three of the six high-performing configurations. This pattern across configurations is a noteworthy finding
because it characterizes high performance configurations across time. Specifically, this pattern is robust to changes in
the samples of cases considered for each temporal windows (some F1 firms die, while others enter the race) and to
environmental changes (such as regulatory changes).
Table 6 illustrates the business model configurations that are associated with low performance in each of the ana-
lyzed temporal windows. An important insight of QCA is the idea that the conditions that are associated with the
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Table 4. Comparison of business models in F1
Constitutive parts
of a business model
BM1: Internal knowledge
transfer
BM2: External knowledge
transfer
BM3: Formula one supply BM4: Talent
Customer
identification
Customer: OEM that owns
the F1 firms.
The automaker supports the
F1 firm, expecting it to
develop solutions for road
car design and
manufacture.
Customer: firms and organ-
izations outside F1 that
buy bespoke technology
and consulting services
from F1 firms.
Customer: other F1 firms.
F1 firms sell technology and compo-
nents (i.e., engines, gearboxes,
ECUs) to other F1 firms. They are
often bundled with post-sale
services and further technological
development programs.
Customer: other F1 firms or motorsport firms in
other racing categories.
F1 firms set up training programs to identify prom-
ising future drivers, train them, employ them to
develop technology, and later trade or loan them.
Customer
engagement
Engagement: “Taxi”.
Each OEM supports F1 with
different levels of commit-
ment, depending on the
results that they aim to
achieve.
Engagement: “Taxi”.
The service is tailored to each
customer’s requirements.
Engagement: “Bus”.
The F1 firm that works as F1 sup-
plier provides its F1 customers
with standard components with
minor or no adaptations. Standard
prices apply. Taxi services are
available for after-sale programs.
Engagement: “Taxi”.
The training program is tailored to the driver, and
participants might be traded via different modes
(loan, sell) and prices.
Value chain
linkages
The OEM coordinates the
internal knowledge trans-
fer between the F1 firm
and the R&D/product div-
ision of their road car
production.
The F1 firm delivers the
required service to the
client. F1 firms provide
consulting in several
industries.
Buyer/supplier contracts can include
products and services. Costs vary
from year to year—about €10 mil-
lion for a conventional engine and
€5 million for kers and engineering
support (in 2013).
The F1 firm runs a driver’s training through minor
categories, and ultimately to F1. This includes
connections with other firms in the other racing
series, which are either owned or independent.
Monetization OEMs support F1 activity
economically through
internal financing.
The external companies pay
the F1 firms for the service
received.
The customer firms pay the F1
supply firm following installations
that vary from contract to
contract.
F1 firms set up training programs not only to trade
the drivers to other firms but also to save money
on the training and future top drivers’ employ-
ment (drivers are often bound to the training
firms via contracts).
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presence of an outcome (e.g., high performance) may be quite different from those that are associated with its ab-
sence (e.g., low performance) (Fiss, 2007).
While several low-performing configurations feature the talent business model similarly to high-performing con-
figurations, this business model is adopted in isolation rather than together with the F1 supply business model in
low-performing configurations. This finding provides indirect evidence of possible complementarities between the
talent and F1 supply business models when they are jointly adopted. We provide additional direct qualitative evi-
dence regarding these complementarities in a separate section below. An additional finding is notable. The joint ab-
sence of both supply and talent business models constitutes a common configurational pattern associated with low
performance, as indicated with the gray box in Table 6. In addition, the adoption of either internal or external know-
ledge transfer business models in isolation is also associated with low performance in several configurations (i.e., con-
figurations “e, g, h, i, j”). Only one configuration (i.e., “e”) of the low-performing configurations shown in Table 6
features the joint presence of the F1 supply and the talent business models observed as a dominant pattern for high
performance.
The low-performing configuration “e” (Table 6) and the high-performing configuration “a” (Table 5)—marked
in white out of the gray box in the Tables—represent two exceptions to the configurational patterns detected across
Table 6. Low-performing configurations of business models identified via QCA
Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations
2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013
a a b c d e f d g c d h a i j a
Internal knowledge (BM1)              
External knowledge (BM2)             
F1 supply (BM3)               
Talent (BM4)             
Consistency 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Raw coverage 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.57 0.57 0.14 0.67 0.67 0.17 0.86 0.86 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Unique coverage 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.29 0.15 0.28 0.28
Overall solution consistency 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Overall solution coverage 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.86 1.00 1.00 0.43 0.72
Number of cases per analysis 10 11 11 11 10 12 12 12
Note: The gray box highlights robust configurational patterns associated with high performance across time (robust to environmental and regulatory changes over
time and to changes in the samples of cases examined over time).
Table 5. High-performing configurations of business models identified via QCA
Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations Configurations
2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 2011–2012 2012–2013
a b c d e f c d c d e f c d
Internal knowledge (BM1)          
External knowledge (BM2)          
F1 supply (BM3)              
Talent (BM4)              
Consistency 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Raw coverage 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.20 0.20 0.60 0.60
Unique coverage 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
Overall solution consistency 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Overall solution coverage 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.80
Number of cases per analysis 10 11 11 11 10 12 12 12
Note: The gray box highlights robust configurational patterns associated with high performance across time (robust to environmental and regulatory changes over
time and to changes in the samples of cases examined over time).
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time (described above). Thus, they deserve further explanation. We build on extant studies of F1 (Jenkins, 2010;
Marino et al., 2015) to speculate that environmental shocks in F1—represented by radical shifts in the official regula-
tions (see Marino et al., 2015)—represent a significant source of uncertainty, reshuffling competition and weakening
the association between business model configurations and performance. In fact, within our observation period, the
years 2005, 2006, and 2009 are the only years in which F1 competition underwent radical shifts in the regulations. It
is interesting to note that the only two noteworthy exceptions in our database fall precisely within those years.
Importantly, Tables 5 and 6 also report several measures of “consistency” and “coverage” for the identified con-
figurations, following standards of good practice in QCA studies (e.g., Ragin, 2008). “Consistency” refers to the ex-
tent to which cases featuring a given configuration consistently display the outcome of interest. A common way to
measure consistency (followed here) is the number of cases featuring a given configuration and the outcome divided
by the number of cases featuring the same configuration but not featuring the outcome (Ragin, 2008). “Overall
Solution Consistency” refers to the same measure aggregated across all the identified configurations. We set the con-
sistency threshold to 0.80, which is the standard recommended threshold (Ragin, 2008). The high level of consistency
of the configurations reported in Tables 5 and 6 has to be interpreted with caution, keeping in mind the limited num-
ber of cases included in our samples in each temporal window (reported below the tables). In fact, configurations are
likely to be consistent when they include a limited set of cases. At the same time, it is worth reiterating that the sam-
ple analyzed in each time window included all the F1 firms competing in that particular racing season.
Following Ragin (2008), we also report three measures of coverage. “Raw Coverage” refers here to the number
of cases featuring the outcome and a given configuration divided by the number of cases featuring the outcome.
“Overall Solution Coverage” refers to the same measure aggregated across all the identified configurations. “Unique
Coverage” indicates the proportion of cases featuring the outcome that are covered uniquely by a given configuration
(no other configuration cover those cases). The overall solution coverage scores of the high-performing configur-
ations identified (Table 5) vary from 0.40 to 1. This means that, at a minimum, these configurations account for
about 40% of the instances of the outcome (high performance) in a time window, accounting for larger proportions
of the outcome in several of the time windows analyzed. Similarly, the overall solution coverage scores of the low-
performing configurations (Table 6) vary from 0.33 to 1, accounting for a minimum of about 33% of the instances
of the outcome (low performance) in two time windows (2006–2007, 2007–2008) and for much larger proportions
of the outcome in the other time windows. Although these coverage values are substantive, and aligned with other
QCA results published in top academic journals in management (e.g., Bell et al., 2014; Garcia-Castro and Francoeur,
2014), they also indicate considerable elements of randomness or idiosyncrasy in the association between business
model configurations and performance. In addition, since the configurations in Tables 5 and 6 identify only the con-
figurations that pass the 0.80 consistency threshold set for the analysis—i.e., being, in other words, the consistent
configurations associated with the outcome—there are other configurations that can be associated with high or low
performance. Further, as per our discussion of the consistency scores, these coverage values need to be interpreted
with caution, keeping in mind the small-N nature of our QCA analysis.
Finally, it is important to note that the overall solution coverage scores of the configurations identified in Tables 5
and 6 change through the time windows analyzed. For example, we note that in the windows 2009–2010,
2010–2011, and 2012–2013, the coverage values of the configurations for high performance (Table 5) are higher
than in the other time windows. Similar higher coverage scores are detected in the analysis of configurations for low
performance (see 2008–2009, 2009–2010, 2010–2011, and 2012–2013). These higher coverage scores are due to the
fact that these configurations are partially overlapping in terms of cases covered—i.e., there are several cases that
adopt more than one of the configurations identified in each time window—as clarified by the difference between
unique coverage and raw coverage in those time windows. In other words, the configurations identified in those time
windows are more encompassing, including more cases (higher raw coverage); but they are also less unique (lower
unique coverage) because they are shared by several F1 firms in those particular years.
4.2 Two polar cases of business model configurations and performance changes
To further substantiate the QCA results in this section, we report two case histories of firms that underwent consider-
able performance changes with the adoption of new business model configurations. In particular, we selected Red
Bull Racing as an F1 firm that improved its performance from 2006 onward with the adoption of a configuration
comprising supply and talent business models. We contrast the case of Red Bull Racing with the polar case of
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Williams, a firm whose performance deteriorated over the years with the introduction of a business model configur-
ation comprising the external knowledge transfer business model.
4.2.1 Red Bull Racing
In 2005, Dietrich Mateschitz—owner of the renowned Red Bull energy drink company—decided to acquire a failing
F1 firm: the English “Jaguar” (which was refunded as Red Bull Racing). Given the association between energy drinks
and performance in extreme sports, Mateschitz aimed at matching the Red Bull brand image with a jaw-dropping
racing performance in F1. One of Red Bull Racing’s first initiatives was to set up a driver training program—named
“Red Bull Junior Team”—for young talented kids, undertaking a progressive training through karting, minor for-
mula series, and gaining F1 entry-level experience in other F1 teams, before landing at Red Bull Racing, as described
by this quote:
From the moment that the Red Bull Junior Team was founded, the objectives were clear, and the search for future Formula
One World Champions had begun. Hand-picked international talents would receive professional and continuous training in
all relevant areas of motorsport. Only those drivers who have the implicit talent for a sustainable Formula 1 career are sup-
ported. (Source: Red Bull Junior Team’s Web site).
Beyond training drivers to achieve prime results in F1, Red Bull Racing needed to develop technological excellence,
which was lacking given the mediocre performance of the original F1 teams it derived from (i.e., Jaguar), and the
consumer-good background of its mother company (i.e., Red Bull energy drink). Between 2006 and 2009 Red Bull
Racing supplied a chassis to Scuderia Toro Rosso2 and, after 2009, supplied the gearbox, in line with what we
defined as “supply business model” in F1. By selling parts to another competing F1 firm, Red Bull Racing obtained
additional opportunities to test its own technology and thus critical knowledge resources, such as additional telem-
etry data, which became useful for technological development and increased the technicians’ learning curve. At the
same time, through the Driver Junior Team, Red Bull Racing started to identify, monitor, train, and promote young
sport talents from their very early age, through other racing categories and ultimately at Scuderia Toro Rosso, thus
forging their qualities in the years where they can learn more effectively the skills required to excel in professional
racing.
Despite large budgets, high ambitions, and a technological support through the data obtained via the supply busi-
ness model (BM3), Red Bull Racing did not initially achieve high performance. However, when their first driver
Sebastian Vettel completed the training program (developed via the talent business model) and arrived at Red Bull
Racing, the F1 firm started experiencing durable performance improvements (second in 2009 and first in each the fol-
lowing 4 years). In line with our findings, the transition from low to high performance corresponded to a change
from a low-performing to a high-performing business model configuration, as since 2009 Red Bull Racing fully de-
ployed both BM3 (i.e., F1 supply) and BM4 (i.e., talent). The outstanding results with the second driver emerging
from a full enrollment with the Red Bull Junior Team training program (Daniel Ricciardo in 2013–2014) are consist-
ent with our finding that the joint adoption of the F1 supply and talent business models for Red Bull Racing con-
tinues to be associated with firm high performance. In fact, when only one of these two business models was
implemented in isolation, the firm’s results were associated with low performance. Furthermore, the adoption of the
talent business model also had significant economic benefits for Red Bull Racing. While driving for Red Bull Racing,
Vettel accepted to work for a relatively low salary (compared with his market value, especially considering his out-
standing records), which led to significant savings for his F1 employer. Despite dominating the F1 driver champion-
ships for 4 years in a row (2010–2013), Vettel received “only” $2.5 million in 2010, $11 million in 2011, $12
million in 2012, and $18 million in 2014. By contrast, despite never winning one single championship with Ferrari,
Fernando Alonso received $37.5 million in 2010, $42 million in 2011, 37.5 million in 2012, and $29 million in
2013. After a mediocre performance in 2014 (fifth in the driver’s championship), Vettel was sold to Ferrari for a 3-
year contract; his future salary will be around $80 million per year. Although official figures are not disclosed, some
2 Despite sharing the same ownership, Red Bull Racing and Scuderia Toro Rosso are two completely separate companies
with distinct facilities, resources, management, budgets, and competing objectives (Source: Formula1.com). In fact,
each technological or human resource trade between the two firms corresponds to a traditional economic transaction
just as between two different firms in the F1 arena. In addition, these two firms were competing on the racing track.
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F1 informants suggested that Ferrari might also have paid a fee to Red Bull Racing to early release Vettel from his
obligations.
4.2.2 Williams
Founded in 1977 by Sir Frank Williams, this British firm is the second most successful F1 firm in history, owing to
nine constructor F1 championships. To date, Williams remains one of the few top F1 firms that have never been part
of a road car company, despite having engaged in multiple collaborations with automotive firms (e.g., Jaguar,
Porsche, and Audi). In the late 1990s and early 2000, Williams obtained mostly high performance results (i.e., third
in 2000 and 2001; second in 2002 and 2003). However, in 2004 it began a progressive decline, leading the firm to
compete first in the “midfield” (fourth in 2004, fifth in 2005) and to ultimately reach the lower part of the ranking in
subsequent years (eighth in 2006 and 2008, seventh in 2009, sixth in 2010, ninth in 2011, eighth in 2012, and ninth
in 2013). Despite employing both experienced drivers with a successful track record and young promising drivers,
Williams never started an official junior driver program (i.e., BM4) and never established a supply technology busi-
ness for other F1 firms (i.e., BM3). However, Williams started its own external knowledge transfer business model
(i.e., BM2), with two separate divisions called Williams Advanced Engineering (established in 2008) and Williams
Hybrid Power (acquired in 2010), which delivered technological solutions to several industries, including the auto-
mobile, public transportation, and motorsport industries. Specifically, Williams Hybrid Power based most of its pro-
jects on the adaptation of electric flywheels—which were originally developed from an innovative kinetic energy
recovery system (also called “kers”) for F1 racing (for a detailed explanation on kers in F1 see Marino et al., 2015)—
for hybrid powertrains to other vehicles (e.g., Jaguar C-X75, Audi R18 E-Tron Quattro, and Porsche
911 GT3R hybrid).
Williams Advanced Engineering continues to focus on delivering energy efficient solutions through incubating and develop-
ing new technologies that primarily originate within our Formula 1 operations, to a broad range of industry sectors including
automotive, aerospace, and energy (Source: Mike O’Driscoll, Williams Group CEO).
In line with our findings, Williams’ implementation of BM2 since 2008 and lack of adoption of BM3 and BM4 cor-
responded to a clear decline in Williams’ racing performance. Similar to the case of McLaren, industry analysts asso-
ciated this decline with a lack of focus on core activities in favor of extra-industry undertakings. In fact, whereas F1
technology is often adapted to fit third-party needs, knowledge from external environments is seldom directly applic-
able to F1 car technology. Accordingly, despite the positive financial returns coming from these external knowledge
transfer activities, in April 2014, Williams decided to sell Williams Hybrid Power to an external company (i.e.,
GKN), which paid Williams about $13 million to use Williams’ technology to improve fuel economy in buses.
Williams decided to sell the division because no additional learning opportunities were triggered by these consulting
activities and because it desired to refocus on racing activities:
Williams has always been a racing team and wants to keep the focus on competition, even if there is much potential in using
its technology to create revenue ( . . . ) For Williams, the technology, developed for racing, was not of any further use, and so
the subsidiary has been turned into cash instead. The deal includes ‘additional consideration’ (i.e., further cash) based on fu-
ture sales and licenses of the flywheel energy storage technology transferred to GKN. This means that it will continue to pro-
vide the team with money and reduce the amount of hassle involved: a win-win situation for all concerned. (Source: F1 media
expert).
4.3 The complementarities underlying high-performing business model configurations
While QCA helps us identify which business model configurations are associated to high and low performance, it
does not provide details about the nature of the complementarities underlying different business model configur-
ations. To better understand this aspect, we conducted a second round of in-depth interviews with three F1 experts
(see Table 3).
We found that by selling relevant technological components to other F1 firms, F1 teams that operate as part sup-
pliers gain access to a set of critical resources that go beyond financial returns: they access a large set of data and in-
formation about their own technological components derived from their clients’ cars—i.e., data on how the supplied
engines perform in clients’ cars during races.
More teams running the power units would mean more data to support development. (Source: F1 Media expert)
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This implies that the more F1 firms engage with F1 competitors as customers, the bigger the data they obtain: for ex-
ample if a firm sells its engines to other two F1 firms (e.g., Ferrari sold its engines to Scuderia Toro Rosso and
Sauber), the F1 firm will access technical data from six cars on the racetrack (each F1 firms deploys simultaneously
two cars):
Selling engines allows you to get data . . . ; the more technical feedback you get, the more you can advance your engines . . . ;
little glitches can happen that you learn from . . . (Source: F1 Media expert).
You collect much more info having six cars on the track as opposed to only two. (Source: F1 media expert)
This larger and enhanced set of data represents an additional resource, supporting learning processes and enhancing
capabilities for technology development. Indeed, this helps the engineers designing and manufacturing a better car,
which is the basic technology used to train drivers and develop the drivers’ skills. As a consequence, because of data-
informed training, drivers achieve a better understanding of their firm’s technology and can provide better feedback
to the engineers regarding how to improve technological components, thus further enhancing the firm’s technological
capability. Better drivers and better technology are the fundamental premise for fostering F1 firms’ racing results as
well as their other outcomes deriving from other activities (prospect technological supply, sponsorships, brand royal-
ties, etc.). Additionally, drivers who receive successful coaching within a F1 firm’s training program provide value in
other ways. First, their engagement with the firm means that they are usually willing to accept pays that are lower
than their actual market value—see Sebastian Vettel’s example above. Second, as F1 firms with a talent business
model often hold exclusivity rights regarding their trained drivers, once they decide to trade one of them they might
receive a fee from the hiring firm to release the driver from the contract:
Red Bull now is achieving massive saving by having two ‘cheap’ drivers. Red Bull invested in them at a youngest age, and it is
now going to make savings from that investment. ( . . . ) And if you save money on a driver, you can spend it somewhere else,
maybe on technology (Source: F1 media expert).
Teams have already sold drivers. Williams sold Jenson Button. They had a 5-year contract on him, and in order to escape
from it, he had to pay them. He wanted to go off to Benetton, and he had to buy his way out from Williams’ contract, and so
part of the team was funded by Button himself. It happens a lot. (Source: F1 media expert).
Finally, as drivers who are trained through the talent business model are used to perform with their F1 firm’s technol-
ogy, the firms combining the talent and supply business models enjoy the possibility of commercializing technology
and drivers in bundle. This does not happen only at Red Bull Racing as illustrated above: Ferrari’s relationship with
Sauber and Marussia further confirms that complementarities are achieved by combining supply and talent business
models in bundle. For example, in 2014, Ferrari sold its engine to Marussia and bundled the engine with the loan of
Jules Bianchi, one of the drivers trained in the “Ferrari Driving Academy.” Before the driver left racing due to a tragic
injury during a race in the 2014 season, Ferrari’s plan was to move Bianchi, through a series of agreements, from a
low-performing firm such as Marussia to a mid-field Ferrari-powered firm such as Sauber, and ultimately to Ferrari.
Ferrari selling the engine to Marussia does help financially (if Marussia paid!) with the data, and the other advantage that
they get from it, of course, is that they are training a driver. Now, the fact that the driver [Jules Bianchi] unfortunately killed
himself, means that they now don’t have the driver they had planned on, and it will cost them in the long term, because the
plan for next year was for Bianchi to go to Sauber, and that was Sauber’s business plan ( . . . ). One can use the loan for driver
training, and certainly, there was a plan for Bianchi to drive for Ferrari if he kept delivering. (Source: F1 media expert).
Given that Jules Bianchi could not move to Sauber, another young driver from the Ferrari Driving Academy, Raffaele
Marciello, moved to Sauber F1 team as test and reserve driver in 2015. At the same time Esteban Gutie´rrez was hired
by Ferrari as test driver from the Ferrari-powered Sauber team. This suggests that while exposed to Ferrari’s technol-
ogy (i.e., engine) during his time at Sauber, Gutie´rrez acquired the right capabilities to become a strategic asset for
Ferrari’s technological development—especially regarding the engine—and possibly become one of the two official
Ferrari drivers later in his career.
On the engine side, he [Esteban Gutie´rrez] already knows what to expect, because the Saubers he raced were Ferrari-
powered. (Source: Motorsport.com).
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I hope that my experience with the Ferrari engine will mean I can contribute to the development of the new power unit.
(Source: Esteban Gutie´rrez, Ferrari Test Driver).
Overall, the empirical evidence supports the finding that the joint adoption of the supply and talent business models
creates resources as well as capability-enhancing complementarities between the development of better technologies
and the development of better drivers. These benefits improve both the firm’s and the drivers’ learning, to the extent
that they reduce the time to achieve high performance.
Our data reveal an additional example of complementarity between the internal knowledge transfer and the F1
supply business models, providing evidence on the high-performing configurations combining these two models
identified via QCA (see Table 5): by selling components to other F1 firms, F1 firms learn how to better develop their
components and parts for technology transfer to road car manufactures (i.e., internal knowledge transfer). F1 firms
that sell engines to other firms have a better opportunity to test and develop their own technology. Accordingly, these
firms can enhance their knowledge base that represents the starting point for transferring F1 innovations from
small-scale prototype manufacturing to large-scale road cars productions. By contrast, road car companies that
highly benefit from receiving F1 technology and from the opportunity to transform such technology into commer-
cially viable innovative automotive solutions are usually willing to increase their financial support to the supplying
F1 firm.
Nevertheless, complementarities do not always arise and do not apply to every set of activities. We note a lack of
complementarity between the external and the internal knowledge transfer business models. In interviews with our
informants, we found that joint implementation of the internal and external knowledge transfer business models can
be detrimental to performance because it induces F1 firms to devote less attention to core F1 activities, such as the de-
velopment of talent and technology. Engaging with internal and external knowledge transfer business models in fact
requires time, effort, and cognitive resources. In other words, F1 firms that engage—for example—in internal know-
ledge transfer, talent development, and external knowledge transfer activities run the risk of losing focus and thus
failing to be effective in racing competitions. Evidence supports this statement. During the 2014 season, Ron Dennis
(CEO at McLaren) identified the “distraction” created by these complex commercial tasks as one of the main reasons
behind the recent decline in performance at McLaren. Accordingly, he affirmed that for the following year the firm
was required to concentrate its focus exclusively on racing (including activities such as those involved in the talent
and F1 supply business models).
The Formula One team has no responsibilities for income ( . . . ); the new model for our Formula One team is that it’s com-
pletely populated by people who have no other objective but winning in Formula One (Source: Ron Dennis CEO of
McLaren)
While F1 cars combine knowledge coming from different domains (e.g., automotive, materials, aerodynamics),
their actual development is extremely specific to racing. The likelihood that the knowledge that is developed for
third parties outside the F1 industry would be easily redeployable in racing is usually low. Hence, the main purpose
of the external knowledge transfer business model is obtaining financial resources from sales rather than
gaining knowledge and learning experiences that could be directly transferred to an F1 firm’s racing activity.
However, money alone is not a sufficient condition to excel in F1—as a matter of fact several deep-pocketed
firms such as Toyota, BMW, and Jaguar (Ford) failed in this goal. Accordingly, focusing on business models related
to racing activities emerges as a key aspect for learning and thus performance in F1. This insight is in line with a
long-established literature emphasizing the importance of focus for high performance as well as the detrimental
effects that strenuous search for synergies can have for the core business (see among others Skinner, 1974; Ketokivi
and Jokinen, 2006).
All in all, apart from the important but somehow obvious financial and commercial returns that each business
model entails, we found that the nature of the complementarity between business models associated with higher per-
formance is capability-enhancing (Kogut and Zander, 1992). This in F1 corresponds to the joint configuration of
two business models (i.e., supply and talent) that focus the racing core activities (i.e., developing racing technology
and training drivers). Still, less focused business models (e.g., internal and external knowledge transfer) that move
the firm’s attention away from its core racing activities might overall reduce learning and thus increase the risk of
being associated with low performance, a result that in F1 cannot be counterbalanced by mere commercial and eco-
nomic returns. Table 7 summarizes how business models are related to resources, enhancing-capabilities, as well as
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Table 7. Resources, capabilities, and complementarities through business models
Business models Resources for racing accessed
via BM
Capabilities for racing
developed via BM
Complementarities with other BM
BM1: Internal knowledge
transfer
- Financial: from sales. - None - None
BM2: External knowledge
transfer
- Financial: from sales. - None - None
BM3: Formula One supply - Financial: from sales.
- Knowledge: additional
telemetry data and
technological insights.
- Improved routines for
technology development.
- By developing a better technology,
trained drivers can enjoy a more
effective training.
- Trained drivers provide better feed-
back to develop the technology.
- Trained drivers can be “sold” in
bundles with technology to other
teams.
BM4: Talent - Financial: from trading
drivers and/or savings from
drivers’ salaries.
-Human: better drivers
- Improved routines for talent
scouting and training
programs.
- Improved driving skills.
- Improved processes of
technological feedback
from the drivers.
- Trained drivers are more familiar
with the technology and can
provide better feedback to the
engineering team.
- Better technologies offer better
opportunities for drivers’ training.
- Trained drivers can be “sold” in
bundles with technology to other
teams.
BMs CAPABILITIES RESOURCES 
BM1 
Internal 
BM2 
External 
BM3 
Supply 
BM4 
Talent 
R
A
C
IN
G
 P
E
R
F
O
R
M
A
N
C
E
 
Financial Resources  
(e.g. revenues) 
Human Resources 
(e.g. trained drivers) 
Knowledge Resources 
(e.g. telemetry data) 
Tech Development 
(e.g. engineers) 
Driving Skills 
(e.g. driving) 
Technical Skills 
(e.g. drivers’ engineering 
support) 
Figure 1. Relationship between business models, resources, capabilities, and performance.
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mutual complementarities with other business models. Figure 1 represents the relation between these three types of
elements and performance. Solid arrows represent relationships between different kinds of elements (e.g., business
models and resources), while dashed ones represent complementarities between elements of the same kind
(e.g., different capabilities).
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this study we explore the association between business model configurations and different levels of performance in
a technology-based environment (i.e., F1 racing). We find that configurations comprising business models leveraging
technological resources (i.e., F1 supply) and human resources (i.e., talent) are associated with high performance. In
addition, we find that these business models are underpinned by capability-enhancing complementarities, such that
their joint adoption critically accelerates a firm’s learning and enhances its focus on core activities, thus supporting
the development of firm-specific capabilities. These findings provide several contributions to extant research and
hold implications for future research.
First, our findings contribute to the literature that connects business models to technology and performance
(Zott and Amit, 2007, 2008), with particular reference to business model configurations (Markides and Charitou,
2004; Sabatier et al., 2010; Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012), by elucidating the nature of the complementar-
ities underlying business model configurations. Our study highlights that these complementarities may differ depend-
ing on the nature of the linkages connecting the different business models in a configuration. Whereas previous
research has mostly focused on economic complementarities, for example by exploring cross-subsidies among busi-
ness models in two- or multi-sided platforms (e.g., Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012), our article emphasizes
capability-enhancing complementarities. We find that certain business models are useful not only because they create
and capture value within a line of business (i.e., from a given set of customers), but also because they generate human
and knowledge resources that can enrich the value that is generated across business models. That is, they help
enhancing the value of resources and capabilities, which can be used in a different business model adopted by the
same firm.
In particular, in the context of F1 we found evidence that firms whose business models focus on developing and
marketing both industry-specific technology and human talent enhance firms’ capabilities and are associated with su-
perior levels of performance. Similar—but not necessarily identical—configurations are already in place in other
companies in other industries. For example, Pixar, the world’s leading 3D animation movie company, develops its
own 3D-animation software (called “RenderMan”), sells it to third parties (including competitors), and simultan-
eously runs its own “Animation Academy” in which aspiring 3D animators pay an enrollment fee to learn how to
use Pixar’s 3D RenderMan software (Catmull, 2008). If students achieve good results, they may be hired by Pixar
once they graduate or, eventually, end up working for a competitor. Given their training, they might continue to use
Pixar’s technology and, thus, become customers of Pixar’s software business. Beyond this specific example, we sug-
gest that, in order to understand the complex relation between business model configurations and performance, we
need to carefully explore the nature of complementarities underlying this relation, disentangling economic comple-
mentarities from capability-enhancing complementarities.
Second, our work contributes to an emerging stream of studies exploring sport environments to investigate
management topics (Wolfe et al., 2005; Day et al., 2012) by emphasizing the importance of business model
configurations—a phenomenon that has received relatively less attention in this research stream. In fact academic
management studies have increasingly researched sport—and specifically F1—exploring topics such as technological
innovation (Jenkins, 2010; Marino et al., 2015), imitation responses (Jenkins, 2014), status interplay between
F1 firms and their suppliers (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010), and advantages derived from geographical localization
(Pinch et al., 2003; Jenkins and Tallman, 2015). Our article complements these F1-based studies by linking some of
the core topics in this literature (such as technological innovation and learning) to business model configurations,
unpacking how complementarities are related to the development of capabilities. In doing so, we answer the
recent call to leverage the rich availability of sport data for better understanding competitive dynamics (George
et al., 2014).
An interesting implication is that certain F1 firms might still be able to, literally, “stay in the race” despite under-
performing in an industry’s core activities. These firms might economically survive—even though they consistently
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underperform relative to their rivals—because their business models target viable niches. This seems to suggest that
in certain industries different measures of performance coexist. For example, movies, music, art shows, and other cre-
ative products can encounter the critics’ favor and thus be awarded prestigious prizes but remain commercial failures.
Sport teams might be proficient at monetizing their value via fans, sponsors, and merchandizing, yet perform poorly
in matches. Other companies exploring innovative business models (such as Spotify) might experience growth over
the years in terms of their user base, but struggle to make the business profitable. The analysis of business model con-
figurations (explored in this article) points to the importance of being aware of multiple performance criteria when
observing industries and the synergies between business models.
Third, our research design also offers an interesting methodological contribution. Despite the increasing adoption
of QCA methodology in management studies, empirical applications of QCA within the management field have gen-
erally been cross-sectional in nature. Within this field, our work represents a first attempt to apply QCA to a longitu-
dinal database in order to investigate the robustness of configurations over time. Although our application does not
focus on configurational changes across time, we hope our article might represent a starting point for scholars to fur-
ther develop this methodology toward fully longitudinal empirical applications.
Our research holds practical implications for management by offering industry-specific insights, first of all for
industries relying on F1 as a source of innovation (e.g., practitioners in automotive). Scholars affirm that the “diffu-
sion of new pervasive technologies (may) raise productivity and growth, first in the sectors that generate them, then
in those sectors that progressively adopt them” (Brusoni and Sgalari, 2007: 189). We complement this insight by
identifying which firms in F1 are actually engaging in these tasks. Our evidence suggests that firms that are less suc-
cessful on one dimension (e.g., on the racing track) might have higher stakes in knowledge transfer activities and
might therefore represent more committed partners to feed other domains with innovation and technological solu-
tions. Thus suggest a more circumspect enthusiasm toward simplistic approaches focused only on top performers. By
considering all firms and all business models within an industry, researchers and practitioners might discover that
low-performing organizations also offer important opportunities.
However, branching out toward other sectors might also endanger firm performance (Skinner, 1974), particularly
in fierce environments like F1 which seem to favor more focused strategies. We thus suggest that it is important for
managers to be aware of potential pitfalls of such strategies and containing them by leveraging complementarities
with other business models.
The main limitations of our work reside in the idiosyncrasies of our empirical setting as well as the limitations of
our research design that warrant caution for generalizing our results to other industries. Prior research on motorsport
has extensively addressed the issue of the generalizability (see, e.g., Bothner et al., 2007; Castellucci and Ertug, 2010;
Jenkins, 2010; Gino and Pisano, 2011; Marino et al., 2015). Generally, scholars agree that motorsport-based findings
are usually more valuable for high-tech industries, such as the aerospace, defense, nanotechnology, biotech.
Competitive dynamics in F1 are characterized by at least three salient features: highly specialized talent; multiple per-
formance criteria; a fixed number of roles, which limits the employability of human resources. For example, similarly
to many other sports, F1 firms compete via a limited number of talented human resources (i.e., only two official driv-
ers per season are allowed). This limit to the utilization of resources thus makes it viable for an F1 firm to loan tal-
ented drivers to other competitors rather than keeping them inactive. This also happens in professional soccer, where
loaning a young player to a competitor’s team is a common practice fostering revenues and increasing the player’s
value. However, the same logic might not apply in contexts that do not feature similar employability’s constraints, so
that loaning a firm’s employee to a competitor might be unusual. Furthermore, traditional measures of financial per-
formance are of limited value in F1 not only because detailed and reliable financial data are not available—F1 firms
are mostly private companies with a tendency not to disclose actual costs and profits—but also because F1 firms are
often not expected to generate revenues as their main goal in the first place, such as R&D centers. Rather, they de-
velop technology and generate visibility for their owners. Given all the above, future studies could further explore
business models’ complementarity in different settings not limited by these boundary conditions.
Other limitations relate to our research design. Our results show that the association of some business model con-
figurations with different levels of performance is consistent through time despite environmental and population
changes. Still, our research design does not lead to the precise identification of reverse causality and thus we cannot
fully rule out the possibility that high performance in F1 entitles winning teams to sell technology to other F1 com-
petitors, rather than the opposite (i.e., selling technologies provides additional information helping to better perform
in F1). Although the evidence from our cases supports this latter pattern, we acknowledge that both these two
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opposite causal explanations are possible and leave to future studies to test the direction of this complex relationship
more comprehensively. Finally, we identify two exceptions in our configurations that seem to point at a moderating
effect of environmental contingencies. We speculate that radical discontinuities might break the patterns of associ-
ation identified by our study. Future studies should consider exploring the contingent value of exogenous changes
vis-a`-vis the relation between business model configurations and performance. To conclude, we believe that motor-
sport is much more than an inspiring metaphor for firm competition; rather, it represents a viable environment and
research laboratory in which to explore the trajectories of business model research as well as the fascinating evolution
of the automobile industry. With this work, we document part of the processes shaping competition in one of the
most innovative industries connected to automotive technology—an arena that is likely to feed technological innova-
tions for the future of human mobility.
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Appendix
Business Models in the Analysis
BM1: Internal Knowledge Transfer. Several F1 firms collaborate with automotive manufacturers to transfer and
adapt technological solutions from the racing field to road car production. In some cases, F1 firms emerged as special-
ized racing spin-offs from existing road car companies (e.g., Caterham, Renault, Mercedes, Toyota, Honda). In other
cases, road car production was established to commercialize the technological solutions of existing F1 firms (e.g.,
Ferrari, McLaren, Lotus). In both cases, F1 firms’ abilities to develop solutions, which are redeployable in the auto-
mobile industry, are financially repaid—in different ways—by OEMs. This is the essence of this business model. For
example, some firms in our sample (e.g., Ferrari, Mercedes, McLaren, Marussia, Renault, and Caterham) were part
of an industrial group that included road car manufacturers. Other F1 firms instead (e.g., Williams) transferred solu-
tions to external OEM customers (e.g., Audi, Porsche, Jaguar). This is one of the reasons why F1 is considered the
cutting edge of automotive technology, and it is one of the largest feeders of technological innovation to major road
car OEMs.
BM2: External Knowledge Transfer. In this business model, the customers are firms and organizations outside F1,
to which F1 firms sell bespoke technology research and consulting projects. As with most high-tech industries, F1
combines cutting-edge technologies that are derived from multiple fields (e.g., aerospace, mechanics, materials engi-
neering, simulation and information technologies, and telecommunications, among others). This, in turn, allows F1
firms to sell diverse technological applications beyond the F1 domain. Some F1 firms (e.g., McLaren, Caterham,
Williams, Sauber) have seized these business opportunities and established technology consulting divisions aimed at
providing tailored solutions to other companies and industries.
BM3: Formula 1 Supply. Some F1 firms produce additional components to supply other F1 firms (mostly engines).
For example, in 2013, Ferrari supplied engines to Scuderia Toro Rosso and Sauber, gearboxes to Sauber, and gearbox
shells to Scuderia Toro Rosso; Mercedes supplied engines to McLaren and Force India; Red Bull supplied its gearbox
internals to Scuderia Toro Rosso and, until 2009, supplied also the chassis; McLaren supplied its electronic control
units (ECUs) to FIA (the governing body of F1), which then sold them on to all F1 firms as mandatory equipment.
These supply contracts vary from case to case and often include some engineering fitting and after-sale services.
BM4: Talent. In F1, drivers’ ‘talent’ represents a precious source of competitive advantage, and several firms have
implemented structured business models to scout, train their own drivers, and eventually trade or loan them to other
racing firms. F1 firms scout promising drivers when they are still very young (and thus are available comparatively
cheaply), enroll them into customized training programs to become professional drivers, and partially or fully finance
their participation in minor championships (from go-karting, to Formula 2000, Formula Renault, GP3, GP2, DTM,
and Indycar) until they are ready to be promoted to Formula 1—a privilege that is reserved only for the most success-
ful sportsmen. Drivers that underwent a driving academy within a particular F1 firm require on average lower sal-
aries from their “mother team”. In addition to saving (significant) costs from their salary F1 firms often ask the
driver to contribute to part of the training and driving costs via their personal sponsors. Eventually (but not necessa-
rily), the drivers can be loaned or sold to other competing F1 firms or other racing firms in other categories—this
usually corresponds to an additional source of revenues. Some of the training programs for young talent include,
among others, the McLaren Young Driver Development Program (est. 1989), the Red Bull Junior Team (est. 2008—
joined with Scuderia Toro Rosso), and the Ferrari Driving Academy (est. 2009).
Business Models Common to All F1 Firms (Not Considered in the Analysis)
BM5: Concorde Agreement. Through the Concorde Agreement, all the F1 firms that participate in F1 races receive
an annual revenue payment from the FIA, which is mainly derived from broadcasting royalties, on-track sponsor-
ships, and track owners via a series of agreements that are managed centrally by Bernie Ecclestone, the F1 supremo.
Specifically, under the terms of the Concorde Agreement, F1 firms receive 50% of the revenues of the sport, which is
about $800 million today. The amount that each firm receives is calculated on a standard scale based on their individ-
ual performance in the previous race series—which makes it a ‘bus’ model.
Business model configurations and performance 675
 by guest on D
ecem
ber 18, 2015
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
BM6: Visibility and Sponsorships. All F1 firms enjoy a basic level of visibility, through media, broadcasting, and
spectators at the races, which, in turn, creates opportunities for them to advertise space (e.g., logos on cars and cloth-
ing, technical partnerships) to other companies and thus to establish a set of business sponsorship activities. All F1
firms receive various measures of financial and technical support from their different suppliers, partners, supporters,
and organizations, as well as merchandizing branded clothes and gadgets for fans and supporters. Additionally, F1
firms receive royalty fees from their sponsors, who in turn increase their own sales results because of the visibility of
their association with F1 firms and the sport in general. Sponsorship and co-branding royalties are based on the firm’s
status and the level of the visibility that the sponsors want to achieve and thus are tailored to the particular sponsor-
ing customer—making such partnerships ‘taxi’ engagements. Another way to collect money from visibility and spon-
sorship relates to driver pay. Most professional drivers are supported throughout their career by one or more
organizations or institutions—e.g., firms, governments, investor groups, and families—which sponsor them by cover-
ing part or all the costs during their racing careers.
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